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HFOSS members Finish Strong at CCSCNE 2010 Poster Contest


HFOSS members Christopher Fei'10, Prasanna Gautam'11 from Trinity College  placed 2nd for their poster "Ad-Hoc Networking on the Android Platform" and Samuel DeFabbia-Kane'11 from Wesleyan University placed 3rd for "Detecting Denial of Service Attacks on a Simulated Tor Network" at the 15th Annual Consortium for Computing Sciences in Colleges Northeastern Coference, CCSCNE 2010, student poster competition.

 

 

Category: announcement
Posted by: Trishan

Prof.Norman Danner, Sam DeFabbia-Kane, Christopher Fei, Prasanna Gautam and Prof.Ralph Morelli

 

HFOSS members Christopher Fei'10, Prasanna Gautam'11 from Trinity College  placed 2nd for their poster "Ad-Hoc Networking on the Android Platform" and Samuel DeFabbia-Kane'11 from Wesleyan University placed 3rd for "Detecting Denial of Service Attacks on a Simulated Tor Network" at the 15th Annual Consortium for Computing Sciences in Colleges Northeastern Coference, CCSCNE 2010, student poster competition.

Ad-Hoc Networking on the Android Platform

Christopher Fei, Prasanna Gautam
Trinity College
Advisor: Ralph Morelli, Professor of Computer Science at Trinity College

POSIT (Portable Open Search and Identification Tool) is an Android application written by students with the Humanitarian FOSS Project. The application helps aid search and rescue efforts by allowing the transmission of data recorded in the field to and from a central server. Data is typically sent to and from an Android device via a WiFi connection or cellular data connection such as 3G. However when POSIT is deployed to help relief efforts in a disaster situation, there is no way we can rely on the existence of such wireless infrastructure. Thus, POSIT and the Android platform need a way to allow devices to communicate directly with one another, without employing a central server. That is, we need a way for Android devices to form an ad-hoc network. We have implemented ad-hoc communication as a module in POSIT by using the Random-Walk Gossip(RWG) protocol, developed at the Real Time Systems lab at Linkoping University in Linkoping, Sweden. The protocol functions with reasonable latency and with no knowledge of the rest of the network, making it suitable for mobile devices. POSIT's ad-hoc communication currently supports sending and receiving text based messages. We report results of field experiments testing the limits of both our implementation and the protocol itself.

Detecting Denial of Service Attacks on a Simulated Tor Network

Sam DeFabbia-Kane
Wesleyan University
Advisor: Norman Danner, Associate Professor of Computer Science at Wesleyan University

ABSTRACT

Tor is an anonymity network that forwards users’ connections through a circuit of proxies. One type of attack commonly assumed to work against Tor is an end-to-end correlation attack [3]. Borisov et al. proposed an improvement to this attack whereby attackers kill circuits they’re present in but can’t compromise [1]. This forces the circuit to be reformed, giving the attacker another chance at compromise.

Danner et al. proposed two algorithms for detecting such an attacker: a theoretical algorithm that requires no more than 3n circuit constructions—where n is the total number of nodes—and a practical detection algorithm that requires O(n+s2) circuit constructions, where s is the number of suspected attackers [2].

We collected data from the Tor network and used that data to construct a simulation of the Tor network to test the practical detection algorithm. We found that it works well, and that minor modifications allow it to run with only O(n+s) circuit constructions.

 

REFERENCES

[1] N. Borisov, G. Danezis, P. Mittal, P. Tabriz. Denial of service or denial of security? How attacks on reliability can compromise anonymity. In CCS ’07: Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 92–102. ACM, October 2007.

[2] N. Danner, D. Krizanc, M. Liberatore. Detecting denial of service attacks in Tor. In R. Dingledine and P. Golle, editors, Financial Cryptography and Data Security: 13th International Conference, FC 2009, volume 5628, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 273–284. Springer-Verlag, February 2009.

[3] B. N. Levine, M. K. Reiter, C. Wang, and M. K. Wright. Timing attacks in low-latency mix-based systems. In A. Juels, editor, Financial Cryptography: Proceedings of the 8th International Conference, FC 2004, volume 3110 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 251–265. Springer-Verlag, February 2004.